Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Existence statement, existence assertion, philosophy, logic: the simple assertion of the existence of an object is problematic because it cannot be empirically refuted. In contrast, quantification is the attribution of properties, not of "naked" existence. E.g. "Socrates exists" is considered by some authors as senseless. See also bare particulars, predication, existence, quantification, existence predicate, iota operator._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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David M. Armstrong on Existence Statements - Dictionary of Arguments
Martin III 182 Negative existential statements/Truthmaker/Lewis: E.g. Lewis: "there are no penguins in the Arctic" is also true without truth makers - because there is no existing counter-example.- "Deficiency" as truth maker or "lack of false makers" is just random idioms. >Truthmaker. MartinVsLewis: a de-ontologization is superfluous. - It is enough to know what we have to watch out for - instead of "how things are" better: "how the world is" - e.g. "search the hole" is completely understandable - VsHacking, Vs "manipulation" as a criterion of existence: does not work with celestial bodies. >Realism/Hacking, >Reality/Hacking._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 |
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> Counter arguments against Armstrong
> Counter arguments in relation to Existence Statements
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-27